







D a gM o r t e nD a l e n
Espen R. Moen
Christian Riis
Norwegian School of Management
BI
Working Paper 2001: 3Designing Competition
in Health Care Markets
D a gM o r t e nD a l e n
Espen R. Moen
Christian Riis
Norwegian School of Management BI
Postal address:P.O.Box 580, N-1302 Sandvika, NORWAY
and
The Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research,
Gaustadalléen 21, N-0349 Oslo, Norway
Health Economics Research programme at the University of Oslo
HERO 2001
© 2001 HERO and the author – Reproduction is permitted when the source is reffered to.
Financial support from The Research Council of Norway is acknowledged.
Health Economics Research programme at the University of Oslo 1998- 2003
ISSN 1501-9071, ISBN 82-7756-047-8Abstract
In this paper we propose a simple, market based mechanism to set prices in
health care markets, namely a system where the patients are auctioned out to
the hospitals. Our aim is to characterize principles as to how such an auction
should be designed. In the case of elective treatment, health authorities
thus organize a competition between hospitals. The hospital with the lowest
price signs a contracts with authority (or the insurer) that commits him to
treat a given number of patients within a predetermined period. However,
this is not a simple mechanism that identi…es the hospital with the lowest
treatment cost. Due to potentially rapid and unpredictable shifts in demand,
treatment capacity may be hard to know in advance. There is always a risk
that treatment must be canceled due to arrival of patients that require acute
treatment. This calls for a market design that accounts for the risk of default.
Our main result is that the expected cost for the government is reduced if
the government chooses to ”subsidize” default. This could be thought of as
a system in which the government buys treatment in the spot market in the
case of default, and let the hospital pay a default fee that is lower than the
spot price. The reason why this reduces expected costs for the government
is that the e¤ect on the bids is asymmetric: The second lowest bid is on
average reduced more than the winning bid. Hence, the winner’s pro…t tends
to shrink. This is due to what we characterize an endogenous correlation.
Since the cost of treatment increases in the default risk (as the hospital must
pay a penalty if it defaults), high cost hospitals typically have larger default
risks than low costs hospitals.1 Introduction
Markets for treatment of patients su¤er from various sources of ine¢ciency.
In purchasing health services, governments want to keep costs per treatment
as low as possible without inducing hospitals to skimp on quality. Ful…lling
this goal seems to constitute a non-trivial problem in most countries and has
triggered health care reforms of various forms. Related to hospital …nanc-
ing, there have been a shift from low-powered cost reimbursement policies
to more high-powered prospective payment systems, which essentially pay a
…xed price per discharge. Although such reforms are expected to improve
cost e¢ciency (and, potentially, quality as well), an important question re-
mains: How should the prices in this quasi-market be set? From a pure
contract design point of view, this may be solved as a problem of regula-
tion under asymmetric information (see e.g. Ma (1994), Ellis and McGuire
(1990), Sappington and Lewis (1999) and De Fraja (2000)).
In this paper we instead propose a simple, market based mechanism to
set prices, namely a system where the patients are auctioned out to the
hospitals. Our aim is to characterize principles as to how such an auction
should be designed. In the case of elective treatment, health authorities
thus organize a competition between hospitals. The hospital with the lowest
price signs a contracts with authority (or the insurer) that commits him to
treat a given number of patients within a predetermined period. However,
this is not a simple mechanism that identi…es the hospital with the lowest
treatment cost. Due to potentially rapid and unpredictable shifts in demand,
treatment capacity may be hard to know in advance. There is always a risk
that treatment must be canceled due to arrival of patients that require acute
treatment. This calls for a market design that accounts for the risk of default.
Ac r e d i b l ec o m m i t m e n tt ot r e a tap a t i e n t sr e q u i r e st h a tt r e a t m e n tc a nb e
bought in the market (possibly at a very high price) in case of a default.
We consider an auction design in which two hospitals compete for a
”treatment-contract” of one single patient. Introducing more hospitals and
more patients would not alter our conclusion. Clearly, the optimization prob-
lem that governments face is how to deal with a large stock of untreated
patients as well as a ‡ow of new patients. Hence, the challenge is to design
a mechanism in which these patients are allocated on hospitals in an e¢-
cient manner. We know from the literature (see Milgrom, 1999)) that this
situation calls for a simultaneous auction procedure. However, as long as
there are no cost complementarities, a very simple auction format solves this
extended optimization problem, namely a simultaneous open cry increasing
auction, where the single patient is the bidding unit, and where each hospital
is free to submit as many bids as it wants. Thus, if cost complementarities
1can be ruled out, we can narrow our focus to an auction of a ”representative
patient”.
Our main result is that the expected cost for the government is reduced if
the government chooses to ”subsidize” default. This could be thought of as
a system in which the government buys treatment in the spot market in the
case of default, and let the hospital pay a default fee that is lower than the
spot price. The reason why this reduces expected costs for the government
is that the e¤ect on the bids is asymmetric: The second lowest bid is on
average reduced more than the winning bid. Hence, the winner’s pro…t tends
to shrink. This is due to what we characterize an endogenous correlation.
Since the cost of treatment increases in the default risk (as the hospital must
pay a penalty if it defaults), high cost hospitals typically have larger default
risks than low costs hospitals.
Our result is related to the literature on ex post distortions in procurement
and franchise auctions (see La¤ont and Tirole (1987), Riordan and Sapping-
ton (1987), McAfee and McMillan (1987)). This literature shows that ex post
distortions (like price above marginal costs or cost sharing) generally will be
optimal in order to promote more competitive bidding ex ante.T h ep o i n ti s
(as explained above) that these distortions a¤ect the expected pro…tability
of the contract di¤erently according to the bidders’ private information. Our
contribution is that we apply this principle to a simple auction mechanism
in a ”market” for treatment of patients in which default risks plays a crucial
role.
2T h e m o d e l
Assume the local government signs a contract that entitles hospital i the
responsibility of treating a patient. Denote by bi the hospital’s cost of treat-
ment, and by qi the probability that the hospital defaults on the contract.
We assume that b and q are private information, distributed according to
the commonly known density function '(b;q). The support of b and q is
given by [0;b]£[0;1]. To simplify the exposition, we assume that b and q are
independent, but as we show in the appendix this is not necessary for our
results to go through.
The probability of default can be interpreted in di¤erent ways. It might
be due to exogenous factors such as the risk of arrival of patients that need
immediate treatment. This process is not under the hospital’s own control.
Alternatively, q might be determined endogenously, resulting from the hos-
pital’s own optimization problem. If the hospital has signed many contracts,
2and must default on some of them, it may to some extent select which con-
tracts to default on. Furthermore, the total number of patients treated in
the hospital depends on e¤ort, organizational adjustments and so on. The
point is that q is stochastic from the government’s point of view, and that
the government lacks complete knowledge about those factors that determine
hospitals’ contracts default.
Who is responsible if the hospital does not complete the treatment of
the patient? We compare two alternative models. In the …rst model the
government signs a contract that entitles the hospital with the unconditional
responsibly to complete the treatment. In this case, the hospital must buy
capacity in the spot market at a price bs > ¹ b if it happens to become short
of capacity (in order to avoid being sued). In the alternative model, the
responsibility of treatment is returned back to the government. In this case,
the government must buy capacity in the spot market, and charges a penalty
bd from the hospital. We assume that the spot price of treatment is equal in
the two models.
The social cost of treating the patient in hospital i is
!i =( 1¡ qi)bi + qib
s;
and represents the weighted average of the internal treatment cost bi and
the spot market price bs. In the …rst model, the private cost of treatment in
hospital i is
vi = !i
and in the second model,
vi =( 1¡ qi)bi + qib
d = !i ¡ qi¯
where ¯ is the subsidy, ¯ := bs ¡ bd. Clearly, the two models collapse to the
same model if the spot market subsidy ¯ is set equal to zero.
3 Equilibrium analysis
First consider the model in which the government auctions o¤ the uncon-
ditional responsibility of treatment. As we have a symmetric, private value
setting, the revenue equivalence theorem applies. Hence any auction format
which allocate the patient to the most e¢cient hospital yields the same ex-
pected cost for the government: The hospital with the lowest social cost wins
and receives a payment equal to the expected second lowest cost, Ev(2) =
3E!(2) , where footscript (j) denotes the j’th rank. This is also an optimal
auction format within this setting.
However since default is an observable event, the government may sign
a contract that is conditional upon the outcome of this draw. This gives
the second model. If the penalty bd is set equal to bs; then the two auction
procedures are identical. However, if bd di¤ers from bs, …rms’ bidding behav-
ior is a¤ected and hence the government’s costs. As the revenue equivalence
theorem still applies, we assume that the seller adopts a second price, sealed
bid auction format. We know from Vickers (1961) that bidding according to
the private cost of treatment is a weakly dominating strategy. Hence, the
hospital with the lowest private cost v(1) wins and receives a payment equal
to the second lowest bid v(2), and compensates the government in the case of
default.
T h ep a y m e n tc a nb ew r i t t e n ,
v(2) =( 1¡ q(2))b(2) + q(2)b
d = !(2) ¡ ¯q(2)
The expected social cost of the contract is equal to the payment the
winning hospital receives plus the subsidy that follows in the event that the
hospital defaults (which occurs with probability q(1)):
v(2) + q(1)¯ =( 1¡ q(2))b(2) + q(2)b
d + q(1)¯ = !(2) +[ q(1) ¡ q(2)]¯
We see that the subsidy a¤ects the bidding, and, hence, the social cost of
the contract. In the remaining part of this section we investigate more care-
fully the optimal level of the subsidy. The optimal subsidy (or, equivalently,





!(2) +[ q(1) ¡ q(2)]¯
ª
By assumption, b and q are independent variables. However, it follows
directly from the de…nition of v that v and q are positively correlated, we
have that cov(v;q)=cov(qb+(1¡q)bd;q)=( bd¡b)2var q. The point is that
a …rm that has high total costs in expected terms also have high default risk,
since this increases total costs. We refer to this as endogenous correlation:
although the default risk is independent of the internal cost b of treatment,
the default risk is positively correlated with total costs (costs of default risk
included). Thus, in expected terms, a subsidy of default is more valuable
for the looser of the auction than for the winner, since the looser is more
likely to have a high default risk. The looser’s expected cost reduction of a
subsidy, and thus the reduction in his bid, is given by Eq(2)¯. The expected
costs associated with subsidizing the winner when he defaults is Eq(1)¯.T h e
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Figure 1:
di¤erence, ¯(Eq(2)¡Eq(1)) is thus positive, and this indicates that a subsidy
may reduce total costs for the government.
However, this is not the end of the story. A subsidy may also change
the identity of the winner of the auction. As the bidders don’t bid on social
costs, one may risk that the hospital with the lowest social costs loses the
competition. This is illustrated in …gure 1, where we measure expected social
cost on the vertical axes and default risk on the horisontal. Assume hospital
1’s social cost and default risk is given by (!1;q 1). Then hospital 2 wins the
auction if (!2;q 2) is in the area A0, otherwize hospital 1 wins. Note that
A0 is constrained upwards by the line !1 = !1¡(q1¡q2)¯, which has a slope
equal to the subsidy rate ¯. Social e¢ciency claims that the hospital with
the lowest ! is chosen; which occurs with certainty if the winning hospital
covers all costs of a default - that is if ¯ =0 .I f ¯ deviates from zero, an
ine¢cient selection may occur. If (!2;q 2) is in the area Z hospital two wins
even though !2 >! 1:
The costs of an ine¢cient allocation of the patients on hospitals are ul-
timately borne by the government. We denote this misallocation cost by
CZ(¯). The government thus faces a trade-o¤: A high subsidy of default
induces aggressive bidding by the looser, and this reduces the expected price
the government has to pay. On the other hand, an increased subsidy also
5increases the costs associated with a misallocation of the patient. An optimal
contract is such that the costs and bene…ts are balanced at the margin.
Still, it is easy to see that the optimal subsidy must be positive. The
reason for this is that the costs associated with misallocation is of second
order around ¯ =0 . To see why, note that an optimal allocation is always
obtained when there is no subsidy, that is, when ¯ =0 . The misallocation
cost CZ(¯) is thus minimized (and equal to zero) at ¯ =0 .F r o mt h ee n v e l o p e
theorem it then follows that C0
Z(0) = 0. On the other hand, the marginal
bene…t,
@E¯(q(2)¡q(1))
@¯ = E(q(2) ¡q(1)) is strictly greater than 0 at ¯ =0 .T h i s
gives the intuition behind the following proposition
Proposition 1 An optimal allocation design implies that the government
subsidizes default, that is, ¯>0
Proof. See appendix.
The reason why such a subsidy reduces expected costs for the government
is that the bidding e¤ect is asymmetric over bid levels. The second lowest
bid is on average reduced more than the winning bid. Hence, the winner’s
pro…t and the social costs tends to shrink.
4 Appendix
Recalling that ! := (1 ¡ q)b + qbs; we can construct a new density function
f(!;q) from the density function '(b;q). The density f(!;q) has support in
A as shown in …gure 1. Referring to …gure 1, type 2 wins, for a given (!1;q 1)
for type 1, if (!2;q 2) ²A0, otherwise type 1 wins. Hence, the expected social
6cost, E
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[!1 ¡ !2 ¡ 2(q1 ¡ q2)¯]f(:)d!2dq2
3
5f(:)d!1dq1:



























2¯f(!1 ¡ (q1 ¡ q2)¯;q2)dq2
3
5f(:)d!1dq1
The …rst term is zero due to the symmetry of the model. The second
term captures the direct e¤ect of the default subsidy on the player’s bidding.
Whereas the last term captures the risk of changing the identity of the winner.
Observe that the latter e¤ect is always negative. First best claims that the
the …rm with the lowest social cost wins. This can be guaranteed by not
subsidizing default. As ¯ increases above zero, the risk that the inferior …rm
has the highest bid increases. Starting out from zero, this e¤ect is of second
order. The second term, however, is of …rst order.
In order to derive the result, it is convenient to …rst solve the model for
the case where the joint density can be written:
f(!;q)=g(!)h(q)
7where g(!) and h(q) are strictly positive for all (!;q)²A and that
R
Ag(!)h(q)=
1. In this case the variables are locally independent in the sense that ! and
q are independent on any rectangular subset in A. Under this assumption,
we can write the e¤ect of an increase in ¯ on the expected cost (in the limit

















































Observe that the second term is strictly negative since q2 is always lower
than q1. Consider now the …rst and the third term. Note that the structure
o ft h et w op a r e n t h e s e si sa sf o l l o w s( s e tx = !1=bs, K(q2) = G(!1)¡G(bsq2)






















=[ H(x) ¡ H(y)]
Z x
y
(q2 ¡ Eq1)(K(q2) ¡ K(Eq1))h(q2)dq2 < 0:
8where Eq1 is the expected q1 given y<q 1 <x :
Accordingly, increasing ¯ slightly decreases the expected cost if ! and
q are locally independent. Before we discuss the more general cases, let us
show that ¯>0 indeed is optimal. To see this, it is su¢cient to show that
expected cost is even higher for all ¯<0. Recall that the third term in (2)
captures the cost of changing the identity of the winner - this cost is clearly









2f(!1 ¡ (q1 ¡ q2)¯;q2)dq2
3
5f(:)d!1dq1 > 0
Hence an optimum at a negative value of ¯ is ruled out. It should be
clear from the calculations above that the result holds also if ! and q are
a¢liated. Actually, a strong negative dependence between ! and q is the
only possibility for our conclusion to change.
A positive correlation between ! and q seems reasonable. Recall that !
is de…ned as follows :! =( 1¡ q)b + qbs.L e t s a y q and b are independent.
In that case ! and q are a¢liated - a high value of q tends to a high value
of !.O r i n o t h e r w o r d s : f o r ! and q to be independent, q and b must be
negatively correlated. Furthermore there are reasons to believe that even q
and b actually are positively correlated: An hospital which is expected to
be closer to the capacity constraint has normally a larger alternative cost of
treatment, as well a larger risk of default.
Finally, it is clear that the above reasoning also goes through in a more
general model. The risk of a change in winner’s identity is still of second
order, as is the probability of a change in the identity of the second highest
bidder. Hence, to see the e¤ect of an increase in ¯ at ¯ =0 ,i ti ss u ¢ c i e n t
to focus on the two highest valuation bidders among the n participants.
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